secession, initiated both South Carolina's secession from the union and encouraged other states to secede. Once the states had decided to move cooperatively to form the Confederacy,6 Rhett was instrumental in calling the Constitutional Convention, and Rhett promoted the idea that the Confederate Constitution be based on the Constitution of the United States.
The Convention consisted of 50 delegates elected from the seven seceding states. Rhett nominated Howell Cobb, a Georgia attorney and former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, to preside over the convention, and the motion was approved by acclamation. Alexander Stevens, an influential delegate from Georgia, called Cobb the most active member of the Convention. Cobb's notes on the Convention credit Rhett and Robert Toombs, also of Georgia, as being the originators of most of the changes made to the document during the Convention. 7 As a whole, the Georgia delegation was undoubtedly the most influential of the Convention, but the general structure of the document had already been determined because the delegates agreed with Rhett's suggestion of using the U.S. Constitution as the model. Because the basic structure of the document was already determined by using the U.S. Constitution as a template, the Confederate Constitution was quickly completed, and adopted by the Convention on March 11, 1861. 8 In outline and in language, the Confederate Constitution follows the Constitution of the United States almost perfectly. It uses the exact same language unless it appeared that an obvious improvement could be made. Furthermore, the Confederate Constitution uses the exact same outline as the Constitution of the United States except when there is an obvious reason to deviate. Thus, for example, Article I, Section 8 of both Constitutions describe the powers of Congress, and both use the same exact wording except when the Confederate Constitution intends to deliberately change the meaning or interpretation.
The similarities between the two documents make the differences stand out as perceived problem areas with the U.S. Constitution that became evident after more than seven decades of experience with the document. The following sections consider the differences between the two documents, and the comparison makes clear that the primary problem that alterations were trying to address was the use of the legislature to engage in distributive politics as depicted in the contemporary public choice literature. It is worth noting that the preamble to the Confederate Constitution states that the states are acting "in order to form a permanent federal government," which differs from the U.S. 
VI. The General Welfare
A very significant difference exists between the two constitutions with regard to the omission of a few words. The Confederate Constitution does not refer to the general welfare. The U.S. Constifederate states were more strongly supportive of states' rights, but by adopting a constitution almost identical to the U.S. Constitution indicated that the protection of states' rights that they perceived in the existing Constitution was sufficient.
10. Carpenter [4, ch. 6], argues in a historical treatise that slavery was a peripheral issue behind secession, and cites numerous sources from the 1850s and 60s to support his point. Regardless of whether this is true, the issue was undoubtedly a major cause of general tension between the North and South. For the purposes of this paper, however, slavery is only relevant to the extent that it affected the drafting of the Confederate Constitution, and the fact is that the issue is not responsible for major differences among the documents. From an economic standpoint, it is probably most interesting that the Confederate Constitution would have protected the value of slaveholdings by prohibiting further importation. Immediately following that clause in the Confederate Constitution is a clause that has no parallel in the U.S. Constitution stating, "but no bounties shall be granted from the Treasury; nor shall any duties of taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry .. ." This clause directly addresses the use of tariffs to shelter domestic industries from foreign competition. The use of protective tariffs had been an important issue in national politics since they were first adopted in 1816. Southern states felt that they bore heavy costs from the tariffs since they were used to protect northern manufacturing. Southern economies exported agricultural commodities and imported almost all the goods they consumed, either from abroad or from northern states. Either way, tariffs that protected northern industries raised the cost of goods in the southern states.
There was strong support among members of the Convention for free trade, but this was balanced against the desire to use tariffs as a revenue source.'2 The wording above was the result of compromise on the subject. Protective tariffs are one of the products of special interest politics, and by prohibiting protective tariffs, the Confederate Constitution was designed to prevent a type of special interest benefit that was apparent in the United States well before the Civil War.
The Confederate Constitution prevents Congress from appropriating money "for any internal improvement intended to facilitate commerce .. ." except for improvements to facilitate waterway navigation, but "in all such cases, such duties shall be laid on the navigation facilitated thereby, as may be necessary to pay for the costs and expenses thereof .. ." Once again, the Confederate Constitution explicitly prohibits general revenues to be used for the benefits of special interests. While reference to the general welfare in the U.S. Constitution might have an ambiguous interpretation, the changes in the Confederate Constitution make clear the interpretation that the Confederate States intended to avoid. The Confederate Constitution's altered wording plainly says that tax revenues are only to be spent for programs that benefit everyone, not programs that benefit a specific segment of the population, and that in cases where allowed expenditures are targeted at a specific segment, taxes to pay for those expenditures must be targeted at the same specific segment. The problems of narrow special interests being able to use democratic government for their own private purposes has been a theme of moder public choice analysis [9, 15] , but the changes in the Confederate Constitution when compared to the U.S. Constitution show that the problem has existed-and has been recognized-since before the Civil War, and that the Confederate States tried to construct their Constitution in such a way as to reduce the problem.'3
VII. Taxation
The problems with taxation in the Union, as perceived by the authors of the Confederate Constitution, paralleled the problem of special interest spending. One provision in this regard was just mentioned, and the clear intent is to implement the benefit principle and have taxes paid by those who benefit from the government's expenditures. In other places the Confederate Constitution added to the Constitution of the United States by requiring that taxes not be levied on those who will not benefit from the expenditures, and that expenditures for programs that benefit a narrow constituency be paid for by taxes on that constituency.
VIII. Appropriations
The Confederate Constitution gave the President a line-item veto with regard to appropriations. "The President may approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill."
Another important difference is that under many circumstances, the decision rule for appropriations was two-thirds majority rather than simple majority. "Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury, except by a vote of two thirds of both Houses, taken by yeas and nays, unless it be asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of departments, and submitted to Congress by the President . . ." In other words, without the President's request, a two-thirds majority of both Houses would have been necessary for Congress to spend money. This fits well within the framework of Buchanan and Tullock [3], who note that larger majorities reduce the external costs of collective decision-making. As Buchanan and Tullock [3, ch. 6] point out, Pareto efficient decisions are guaranteed only when a decision rule of unanimity is used, but less inclusive decisions rules may be optimal when decision-making costs are incorporated into the calculus. However, the greater the consensus, the more likely a decision is to be optimal. The two-thirds rule creates greater consensus, but is also raises decision-making costs. The logic of reverting to simple majority rule when the budgetary request is initiated by the president is that with the president in agreement, there is greater consensus, so a less inclusive decision rule with lower decision-making costs can be used by Congress.
Another provision in the Confederate Constitution read, "All bills appropriating money shall specify, in Federal currency, the exact amount of each appropriation, and the purposes for which 13 . Higgs [8] argues that the dominant ideology of the 19th century was opposed to government intervention in economic affairs, and carefully documents the differences between the 19th and 20th centuries in this regard. Hughes [ 11] , on the other hand, argues that special interests have always been ready-and able-to call on the government for favors. All of these differences in appropriations are clearly aimed at problems identified by the moder model of distributive politics, and show that the problems recently emphasized by public choice theorists have been understood since before the Civil War.
IX. Other Differences
A number of other differences between the two Constitutions exist which deserve remarks. Related to, but more general than, the subject of appropriations, is the provision that "Every law, or resolution having the force of law, shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." This aims at omnibus appropriation bills, but also prevents tying any kinds of unrelated legislation together. The Confederate States wanted to avoid the problem of having legislation viewed as generally undesirable passed because it was tied to some important and desirable legislation.
Another difference was that the President of the Confederate States would be elected to a six year term as President, and would not be eligible to run for another term. In another minor difference, the Post Office was required to be financially self-sufficient. In another difference, while the U.S. Constitution prevents taxes on exports, the Confederate Constitution provided for export taxes if they were approved by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses. Other minor differences exist in the two documents, but the constitutions are similar by design, since it was the intent of the authors of the Confederate Constitution to retain the U.S. Constitution except where they would be able to improve it with the benefit of over seven decades of experience.
X. Conclusion
An analysis of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America provides a great deal of insight into the workings of the Constitution of the United States before the Civil War. The authors of the Confederate Constitution had enough respect for the U.S. Constitution that they were willing to adopt almost all of its general form and language, and modified only those areas in which they believed clear improvement could be made. Thus, an analysis of the differences can pinpoint specific problems that the founders of the Confederacy believed existed in the Constitution's design. Seen in this light, it is interesting to note that the problems the authors of the Confederate Constitution actually did address were overwhelmingly those identified in contemporary public choice models of distributive government. They were concerned about the use of legislative powers to impose costs on the general public in order to provide benefits to narrow constituencies. While the large growth of government in the 20th century has made the problem of distributive politics much more visible, the problem was present and clearly recognized by Americans before the Civil War.
